OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.

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对路径名的限制不恰当(路径遍历)

OpenClaw 路径遍历漏洞

OpenClaw是openclaw开源的一个智能人工助理。 OpenClaw 2026.2.14之前版本存在路径遍历漏洞，该漏洞源于经过身份验证的攻击者可通过向浏览器工具的upload操作提供绝对路径或路径遍历序列，从网关主机读取任意文件。

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