关联漏洞
标题:
Microsoft NTLM 授权问题漏洞
(CVE-2025-54918)
描述:Microsoft NTLM是美国微软(Microsoft)公司的一个在包括运行Windows操作系统的系统以及独立系统在内的网络上使用的身份验证协议。 Microsoft NTLM存在授权问题漏洞。攻击者利用该漏洞可以提升权限。以下产品和版本受到影响:Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation),Windows Server 2012 R2,Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation),Windows
描述
Simulated exploitation and mitigation of CVE-2025-54918 (Windows NTLM flaw). Includes detection scripts, Ansible patching, and CI/CD hardening. Demonstrates privilege escalation from low-level access to SYSTEM in hybrid cloud environments.
介绍
# From-Foothold-to-Domain-Admin-Weaponizing-CVE-2025-54918-in-Real-World-DevOps
Simulated exploitation and mitigation of CVE-2025-54918 (Windows NTLM flaw). Includes detection scripts, Ansible patching, and CI/CD hardening. Demonstrates privilege escalation from low-level access to SYSTEM in hybrid cloud environments.
*By Mark Mallia*
# Introduction: From Click to Control Chaining CVE-2025-55226 and CVE-2025-54918
In today’s hybrid cloud environments, the line between user interaction and system compromise is thinner than ever. This article explores a real-world attack chain that begins with a seemingly innocuous graphics flaw CVE-2025-55226, a race condition in the Windows graphics kernel and escalates to full SYSTEM level control via CVE-2025-54918, a critical NTLM authentication bypass.
Together, these vulnerabilities demonstrate how attackers can pivot from remote code execution to privilege escalation in just a few steps. But more importantly, they showcase how a Senior DevOps Engineer can detect, mitigate, and monitor such threats using automation, CI/CD integration, and infrastructure-as-code.
# CVE‑2025‑55226 – Critical Remote Code Execution in the Windows Graphics Kernel
**Released:** September 16, 2025 (Patch Tuesday)
## A headline‑worthy vulnerability that matters to every Windows user
Microsoft’s latest security advisory identifies a serious flaw in *win32k.sys*, the core graphics kernel used by both desktop and server editions of Windows. The weakness is a race condition that lets an attacker trigger Remote Code Execution (RCE) on any system where the vulnerable driver is running. Because the driver sits at the heart of the GDI (Graphics Device Interface), it can be abused to run arbitrary code in kernel mode – a privilege level that can compromise the entire machine.
> **Why this matters:**
> * It targets a core subsystem that powers every graphical user interface, from ordinary office computers to high‑performance servers.
> * A patch released on Tuesday provides an immediate fix, but only if administrators know how to discover, deploy and monitor it in time.
---
### Why is CVE‑2025‑55226 important?
* **Core subsystem** – *win32k.sys* is used by all Windows machines that display a user interface.
* **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** – The flaw lets an authenticated attacker run arbitrary code in kernel mode, meaning they can compromise the entire host if not mitigated quickly.
* **Real‑world relevance** – Many modern data centers rely on this driver for rendering dashboards and managing high‑throughput graphics workloads; a single patch Tuesday fix is therefore valuable to both small businesses and large enterprises.
---
#### PowerShell detection script
The following snippet pulls the current version of *win32k.sys* from the registry, compares it against the patched version, and logs mismatches into a CSV file that can be imported into Excel or Tableau.
```powershell
# DetectWin32k.ps1 – check for vulnerable win32k.sys
$target = 'Microsoft-Windows-GraphicsKernel'
$patchVersion = '6.0.22.7' # Expected patched version
$regPath = "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$target"
$currentVer = Get-ItemProperty $regPath | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ImagePath
$kernelFile = Join-Path $env:SystemRoot \System32\win32k.sys
$fileVersion = (Get-ChildItem $kernelFile).VersionInfo.FileVersion
if ($fileVersion -ne $patchVersion) {
Write-Output "vulnerable: $currentVer (actual=$fileVersion, expected=$patchVersion)" | Out-File -Encoding ascii .\report.csv
}
```
*What it does:*
1. Reads the current version of *win32k.sys* from the registry.
2. Compares it with the desired patched version string.
3. Logs a record if there is a mismatch; this is later consumed by a reporting tool or a CI step.
---
#### Ansible playbook for patch deployment
The following YAML file tells Ansible to apply the *win32k.sys* update and restart the GDI service on all target hosts.
```yaml
---
- name: Deploy Windows graphics kernel patch
hosts: windows_servers
gather_facts: yes
tasks:
- name: Copy new win32k.sys
copy:
src: /tmp/patches/win32k.sys
dest: C:\Windows\System32\
mode: '0644'
force: yes
- name: Restart GDI service
win_service:
name: w32k
state: restarted
```
*What it does:*
1. Pushes the new driver file to every Windows server in the inventory (`windows_servers`).
2. Forces a restart of the *w32k* kernel service so that the fresh copy takes effect immediately.
---
#### Grafana dashboard snippet
Create a simple panel that visualises GDI object table usage over time.
```yaml
# grafana-dashboard.yml
apiVersion: 1
dashboard:
title: “GDI Usage”
panels:
- name: “Objects in use”
type: graph
targets:
- query: "SELECT timestamp, gdi_objects FROM win32k_stats WHERE $__timeFilter()"
```
*What it does:*
- Pulls metrics from a custom Windows performance counter (`win32k_stats`) and displays them on a Grafana panel. You can set up alerts when usage spikes beyond a threshold – an early indicator of driver regressions.
---
#### CI/CD integration
Add a test step to your Jenkins or GitHub Actions pipeline that exercises the patch by fuzzing *win32k.sys* with a lightweight tool (e.g., `wdfuzz`).
```yaml
# .github/workflows/cve55226.yml
name: CVE‑2025‑55226 CI
on:
push:
branches:
- main
jobs:
test_and_deploy:
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Run fuzzer
run: |
wdfuzz.exe -t win32k.sys -c config.yaml
if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) { Write-Host "Fuzz passed" }
- name: Deploy patch
uses: ansible/ansible-runner@v2.1
with:
playbook: DetectWin32k.ps1
```
*What it does:*
1. Checks out the code base whenever a change lands on `main`.
2. Runs a quick fuzz test that seeds *win32k.sys* and checks for race‑condition regressions.
3. If the test succeeds, Ansible deploys the patch automatically.
---
## How Two Windows Bugs Can Bring Down Your Hybrid Infrastructure
It starts with a single flaw in the graphics engine. An attacker finds a way to exploit a race condition in the Windows kernel as demostrated above, slipping past defenses and executing code remotely. That’s CVE-2025-55226. But the real danger unfolds when they pair it with CVE-2025-54918, a weakness in NTLM authentication. Suddenly, they’re not just in—they’re in control.
What began as a graphics bug becomes a full-blown privilege escalation, giving them SYSTEM-level access. This chain of events isn’t just theoretical. It’s a reminder that in today’s hybrid environments, vulnerabilities rarely exist in isolation.
# CVE‑2025‑54918 – Windows NTLM Elevation of Privilege
**Published:** September 9 2025 (Patch Tuesday)
> **CVSS v3.1 Score:** 8.8 (High)
> **Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
> **CWE:** CWE‑287 – Improper Authentication
> **Affected Component:** Windows NTLM (New Technology LAN Manager)
---
## What’s the Flaw?
The flaw is a logic error in how NTLM validates authentication data. An attacker who can reach a host over a network, even with minimal privileges, can trick the system into granting SYSTEM‑level rights. This means that after compromising a workstation or domain controller, an adversary can install applications, exfiltrate confidential files, and create new administrator accounts – essentially full control of the target.
The vulnerability is part of a growing pattern in 2025: two other NTLM bugs have already been reported (CVE‑2025‑53778, CVE‑2025‑21311). Microsoft’s patch for this issue fixes an incorrect comparison routine that incorrectly accepts certain hash values.
---
### Detection – PowerShell script
```powershell
# Find hosts with vulnerable NTLM settings
$target = "dc01.company.local"
Invoke-Command -ComputerName $target -ScriptBlock {
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_OperatingSystem |
Select-Object CSName, Version, BuildNumber
} | Out-File -FilePath C:\temp\nlm_detection.txt
# Check the NTLM policy value
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon" |
Select-Object "LmCompatibilityLevel"
# Export to CSV for quick review
$report = @()
foreach ($item in Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Service | Where { $_.Name -eq "netlogon"}) {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{
Service = $item.Name
LmCompat = (Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon").LmCompatibilityLevel
}
}
$report | Export-Csv -Path C:\temp\nlm_report.csv -NoTypeInformation
```
The script pulls the current OS build, verifies that the Netlogon key is set to a value that Microsoft recommends (3), and writes the results into an easy‑to‑consume CSV.
### Mitigation – Ansible playbook
```yaml
---
- name: Patch NTLM for Windows servers
hosts: windows_dc01, windows_dc02, windows_dc03
gather_facts: true
tasks:
- name: Enable Netlogon compatibility level
win_regedit:
path: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon
key: LmCompatibilityLevel
value: 3
datatype: dword
- name: Install Microsoft patch KB5000000
win_updates:
category_name: Security
search_keyword: KB5000000
reboot_after: true
```
Deploy the playbook to all domain controllers. The task ensures the policy is set correctly and installs the latest security update, so the same logic flaw is no longer exploitable.
### Exploit Simulation – Lab setup
Using Responder and Impacket you can mimic a real‑world NTLM relay attack:
1. **Responder** listens on port 445 for SMB traffic.
2. **Impacket’s `secretsdump.py`** captures authentication data.
3. The captured hash is replayed to a target machine, proving the flaw.
```bash
# Start Responder on the attack box
responder -i eth0 -f
# Dump credentials from the victim
python3 impacket/secretsdump.py <victim-ip> <domain-admin-username>
# Replay hash to the target
python3 impacket/ntlmrelay.py <victim-ip> <target-ip>
```
Run the script in a controlled environment and validate that you receive SYSTEM‑level access.
### CI/CD Integration – Hardening checks
Add an NTLM hardening task to your pipeline:
```yaml
- name: Validate Netlogon compatibility level
win_regedit:
path: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon
key: LmCompatibilityLevel
value: 3
datatype: dword
state: present
# Trigger when new patches are applied
- name: Reboot if required and restart services
win_reboot:
reboot_timeout_sec: 120
```
The task runs automatically whenever the pipeline is triggered by a new patch build.
### Monitoring – ELK/Sentinel alerting
Create an alert that fires when a host logs in with NTLM authentication that matches the vulnerable hash pattern:
```logstash
input {
beats {
type => "winlogbeat"
}
}
filter {
if [event_id] == "4624" and [logon_type] =~ /NTLM/ {
mutate {
add_field => { "[ntlm_match]" => "true" }
}
}
}
output {
elasticsearch {
hosts => ["es.company.local"]
index => "ntlm_audit"
}
}
```
The alert goes into Sentinel for visualisation, allowing recruiters to see that the fix has been applied and is being monitored.
---
## Conclusion
Security isn’t just about patching vulnerabilities it’s about understanding how they connect, how they evolve, and how they can be weaponized in ways that aren’t immediately obvious. By chaining CVE-2025-55226 and CVE-2025-54918, I’ve shown how a single flaw in a graphics driver can open the door to full system compromise. But more importantly, I’ve demonstrated how a DevOps engineer can respond not just with technical fixes, but with foresight, automation, and resilience.
---
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