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I. Basic Information for CVE-2023-42449
Vulnerability Information

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Vulnerability Title
Malicious head initialiser can extract PTs from control of Hydra scripts, leading to locked participant commits or spoofed commits
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
Hydra is the two-layer scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to version 0.13.0, it is possible for a malicious head initializer to extract one or more PTs for the head they are initializing due to incorrect data validation logic in the head token minting policy which then results in an flawed check for burning the head ST in the `initial` validator. This is possible because it is not checked in `HeadTokens.hs` that the datums of the outputs at the `initial` validator are equal to the real head ID, and it is also not checked in the `off-chain code`. During the `Initial` state of the protocol, if the malicious initializer removes a PT from the Hydra scripts it becomes impossible for any other participant to reclaim any funds they have attempted to commit into the head, as to do so the Abort transaction must burn all the PTs for the head, but they cannot burn the PT which the attacker controls and so cannot satisfy this requirement. That means the initializer can lock the other participants committed funds forever or until they choose to return the PT (ransom). The malicious initializer can also use the PT to spoof that they have committed a particular TxO when progressing the head into the `Open` state. For example, they could say they committed a TxO residing at their address containing 100 ADA, but in fact this 100 ADA was not moved into the head, and thus in order for an other participant to perform the fanout they will be forced to pay the attacker the 100 ADA out of their own funds, as the fanout transaction must pay all the committed TxOs (even though the attacker did not really commit that TxO). They can do this by placing the PT in a UTxO with a well-formed `Commit` datum with whatever contents they like, then use this UTxO in the `collectCom` transaction. There may be other possible ways to abuse having control of a PT. Version 0.13.0 fixes this issue.
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
输入验证不恰当
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Title
Hydra 输入验证错误漏洞
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
Hydra是一款渗透测试工具。 Hydra 0.13.0之前版本存在输入验证错误漏洞,该漏洞源于head initializer铸造过程中的数据验证逻辑不正确,恶意头初始化程序可能会为正在初始化的头提取一个或多个 PT 策略,导致在initia验证器中对头部 ST 进行有缺陷的检查。
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Affected Products
VendorProductAffected VersionsCPESubscribe
input-output-hkhydra < 0.13.0 -
II. Public POCs for CVE-2023-42449
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III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2023-42449
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