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I. Basic Information for CVE-2025-15284
Vulnerability Information

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Vulnerability Title
arrayLimit bypass in bracket notation allows DoS via memory exhaustion
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
输入验证不恰当
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Title
ljharb qs 安全漏洞
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
ljharb qs是美国Jordan Harband个人开发者的一个具有嵌套支持的查询字符串解析器。 ljharb qs 6.14.1之前版本存在安全漏洞,该漏洞源于输入验证不当,可能导致HTTP拒绝服务攻击。
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
II. Public POCs for CVE-2025-15284
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III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2025-15284
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IV. Related Vulnerabilities
V. Comments for CVE-2025-15284

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