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I. Basic Information for CVE-2026-33619
Vulnerability Information

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Vulnerability Title
PinchTab has Unauthenticated Blind SSRF in Task Scheduler via Unvalidated callbackUrl
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
服务端请求伪造(SSRF)
Source: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Title
pinchtab 代码问题漏洞
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Description
pinchtab是Pinchtab开源的一个AI代理浏览器控制工具。 PinchTab 0.8.3版本存在代码问题漏洞,该漏洞源于调度器webhook交付路径验证不足,可能导致服务端请求伪造。
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
CVSS Information
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Vulnerability Type
N/A
Source: CNNVD (China National Vulnerability Database)
Affected Products
VendorProductAffected VersionsCPESubscribe
pinchtabpinchtab < 0.8.4 -
II. Public POCs for CVE-2026-33619
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III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2026-33619
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