n8n-MCP has an Authenticated SSRF via instance-URL header in multi-tenant HTTP mode

n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTH_TOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTH_TOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

服务端请求伪造(SSRF)

n8n-MCP 代码问题漏洞

n8n-MCP是Romuald Członkowski个人开发者的一个连接AI助手与自动化工作流平台的模型上下文协议服务器。 n8n-MCP 2.47.4之前版本存在代码问题漏洞，该漏洞源于认证的服务器端请求伪造，可能导致持有有效AUTH_TOKEN的调用者使服务器向任意URL发出HTTP请求。

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