关联漏洞
描述
CVE-2025-61882 — Critical Oracle EBS RCE: Analysis & Response
介绍
# 🚨 CVE-2025-61882 — Critical Oracle EBS RCE: Analysis & Response
## 🌡️ *CVE-2025-61882 — At a Glance*
```
╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ CVE: CVE-2025-61882 ▪ Severity: CRITICAL (RCE, unauth) ║
║ Product: Oracle E-Business Suite (BI Publisher / UI servlets) ║
║ Impact: Remote Code Execution → web shells, data theft, extort.║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
```
| ⚙️ Field | 📌 Summary |
| --------------: | :------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| CVE ID | **CVE-2025-61882** |
| Severity | **Critical 9.8** — unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) |
| Affected | Oracle E-Business Suite (BI Publisher / template rendering / UI servlets) |
| Attack Vector | Network (HTTP), no credentials required in many exploit variants |
| Typical Outcome | Web shell, reverse shell, data exfiltration, extortion/ransom |
---
# 🔬 What it *is* — short & visual
> An unauthenticated HTTP attack chain that leverages SSRF + CRLF/header manipulation + unsafe template rendering to achieve RCE in Oracle EBS.
```
[ Attacker ]
│ crafted HTTP (SSRF + CRLF + path tricks)
↓
[ Public EBS Listener / UiServlet ]
│ internal request or manipulated route
↓
[ BI Publisher / Template Engine ] ← malicious XSLT / template
↓
[ Template Render ] → arbitrary code executes → shell/payload
```
---
# 🧩 Technical Building Blocks (iconized)
* 🔗 **SSRF** — server is tricked into fetching attacker-controlled/internal URLs
* 🪛 **CRLF / Header Injection** — alters how requests are parsed and forwarded
* 🔐 **Auth Bypass** — internal endpoints reached without valid session
* 📄 **Unsafe Template Execution** — XSLT/template rendering triggers runtime code execution
* 🔁 **Multi-stage persistence** — web shell or reverse shell for long-term access
---
# 🕵️♀️ Indicators of Compromise — visual table
| 🔎 Type | 🔔 Example / What to hunt for |
| -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Network | Outbound connections from EBS hosts to unknown IPs; unusual POST/GET sequences targeting UiServlet/RF.jsp |
| HTTP | Very long/malformed query strings, CRLF-like payloads, unusual User-Agent or scripted agent strings |
| Files | New/modified XSLT templates in template stores; JSP/Java files that look like tiny web shells |
| DB | Recent inserts/updates to template tables (xdo_templates / XDO_*); LOBs with embedded code |
| Commands | Reverse-shell patterns (`/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/...`) or `Runtime.getRuntime().exec` in payloads |
---
# 🧭 Detection & Forensics — step checklist (stylish box)
```
┌────────────────────────── DETECTION CHECKS ──────────────────────────┐
│ 1) Capture/review HTTP access logs for UiServlet, SyncServlet, RF │
│ 2) Inspect outbound flows from app servers — block unexpected egress │
│ 3) Query template DB tables for recent LOB inserts/updates │
│ 4) Scan webapp folders for newly modified JSP/CLASS files │
│ 5) Grep logs for "Runtime.getRuntime", "/dev/tcp", "bash -i" │
│ 6) Snapshot disk+memory before remediation if compromise suspected │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
---
# 🛡️ Mitigation Playbook — printable ONE-PAGE
```
╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ IMMEDIATE (0–24h) — STOP THE BLEED ║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
[ ] Apply vendor patch immediately if available.
[ ] Restrict public access to EBS (VPN, IP allowlist, remove public routes).
[ ] Block suspicious HTTP patterns at WAF (long query strings, CRLFs).
[ ] Limit outbound egress from EBS servers (prevent callback shells).
╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ SHORT TERM (1–7 days) — STRENGTHEN ║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
[ ] Disable or restrict template upload/preview if feasible.
[ ] Hunt and remediate using IOC checklist (templates, web shells).
[ ] Harden logging & monitoring; enable alerting on anomalous egress.
╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ MEDIUM TERM (1–4 weeks) — CLEANUP ║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
[ ] Rebuild compromised hosts from clean images / validated backups.
[ ] Rotate all EBS & DB credentials; revoke exposed API keys.
[ ] Apply all recommended vendor fixes and test in staging.
╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ LONG TERM — RESILIENCE & PREVENTION ║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
[ ] Sanitize template engines; strip dangerous extension support.
[ ] Network segmentation: separate admin, app, DB, and external zones.
[ ] Automated patch management; periodic pentests and purple-team drills.
```
---
# 🧾 Quick Hunting Commands (neat code block)
```
# Find recent webapp changes (example)
find /u01/oracle/ -type f -mtime -7 -ls
# Grep logs for suspicious exec attempts
grep -R --binary-files=text -E "Runtime.getRuntime|/dev/tcp|bash -i|base64 -d" /var/log
# Example SQL (pseudo) — find templates created in last 7 days
SELECT template_id, name, created_by, creation_date
FROM xdo_templates
WHERE creation_date > sysdate - 7
ORDER BY creation_date DESC;
```
---
# 🧠 Risk Summary — visual badges
* 🔥 **Probability**: High (exploit is public and weaponized)
* 💥 **Impact**: Severe (RCE → data/compliance/ops fallout)
* 🚨 **Action**: Patch + restrict access + hunt now
---
# 🖼️ Visual Flowchart — compact (graphical ASCII)
<img width="1920" height="957" alt="CVE-2025-61882 Oracle E-Business Suite 1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/612bcb62-4a17-4252-929c-775228ecc0e3" />
<img width="1920" height="960" alt="CVE-2025-61882 Oracle E-Business Suite 4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d562171e-5585-4764-b436-e95d252112c3" />
---
```
╔══════════╗ crafted HTTP ╔══════════════════╗
║ Attacker ║ ─────────────────────>║ Public EBS Front ║
╚══════════╝ ╚══════════════════╝
│
SSRF / CRLF -> │
v
╔════════════════╗
║ Internal JSP / ║
║ Template API ║
╚════════════════╝
│
upload / render of malicious
│
v
╔════════════════╗
║ Template Engine║
║ executes code ║
╚════════════════╝
│
┌────────────┬────────────┴────────────┬────────────┐
│ │ │ │
web shell reverse shell data exfiltration persistence
```
---
# ✅ Final bite-size checklist (3-item action)
1. **Patch** your Oracle EBS immediately (if patch available).
2. **Block** public access or place EBS behind a VPN / IP allowlist + WAF rules.
3. **Hunt** for modified templates, web shells, and unusual outbound connections — remediate fully.
---
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