CVE-2025-24104 PoC — Apple iOS和iPadOS 后置链接漏洞

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# CVE-2025-24104 Writeup: Reading Files Out-of-Sandbox

I reported a bug that Apple later tracked as **CVE-2025-24104**. In my original report, I demonstrated how a malicious backup could be used to bypass sandbox restrictions. However, Apple’s initial description stated that this vulnerability could lead to modifications of protected system files. I want to set the record straight: this bug actually allows an attacker to read arbitrary files outside the sandbox.

## Timeline

- **Found:** April 2024  
- **Reported:** October 2024 
- **Patched:** iOS 18.3 beta 1

## What I Discovered

When I dug into the issue, I found that the vulnerability stems from a lack of proper symlink validation during the backup restoration process. Specifically, if you craft a backup where the file  
`/private/var/containers/Shared/SystemGroup/systemgroup.com.apple.configurationprofiles/Library/ConfigurationProfiles/CloudConfigurationDetails.plist`  
is replaced with a symbolic link, the system ends up reading a file of your choosing—even if it lies outside the sandbox.

## How It Works

- **The Flaw:**  
  The `mc_mobile_tunnel` lockdown service fails to check whether `CloudConfigurationDetails.plist` is a symlink. If it is, the service follows the link, allowing an attacker to retrieve the content of any restricted file.

- **Steps to Reproduce:**  
  1. **Create a Malicious Backup:**  
     I crafted a backup where `CloudConfigurationDetails.plist` is a symlink that points to any restricted file.
  2. **Restore the Backup:**  
     I restored this backup on a device and rebooted it.
  3. **Exploit the Bug:**  
     Using a lockdown connection, I sent the `GetCloudConfiguration` command to the `com.apple.mobile.MCInstall` service. Instead of getting the expected file content, the service returned the contents of the file my symlink pointed to.

## Why It Matters

The ability to read arbitrary files outside the sandbox is a serious issue. It means that sensitive system data, which should remain protected, could be exposed to attackers. This isn’t just a minor bug—it’s a fundamental security flaw in how backups are handled.

## My Recommended Fix

To fix this, the backup restoration process needs a more rigorous check:
- **Symlink Validation:**  
  Before reading any file like `CloudConfigurationDetails.plist`, the service should verify that it’s a regular file and not a symlink. If it is a symlink, the restoration should either reject it or handle it safely.
- **Sandbox Enforcement:**  
  Strengthen sandbox restrictions so that even if a symlink is followed, it cannot point to files outside the intended area.

## Patch Details

With the release of **iOS 18.3**, Apple introduced additional checks in the **ManagedConfiguration** framework to remove any symlinks found in the `ConfigurationProfiles` folder. Specifically:

- A new function called `MCRemoveFileIfSymlink` was added.
- This function is invoked by `MCFixHostileSymlinks`.
- Whenever a file in the `ConfigurationProfiles` folder is identified as a symlink, it is immediately deleted.

You can see the **bindiff** details here:  
[https://github.com/blacktop/ipsw-diffs/blob/main/18_2_22C152__vs_18_3_22D5034e/DYLIBS/ManagedConfiguration.md](https://github.com/blacktop/ipsw-diffs/blob/main/18_2_22C152__vs_18_3_22D5034e/DYLIBS/ManagedConfiguration.md)

Below is a screenshot of my own diff showing where the new checks were added:

![Screenshot showing patch](/diff.jpg)

### Note on Mitigation Effectiveness
It’s worth mentioning that this new mitigation **does not fix the issue 100%**. I’ve already found a method to bypass it because Apple didn't implement my recommended fix, but I will keep those details private.

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This is my personal account of **CVE-2025-24104**, emphasizing that Apple’s original description missed the mark. The true risk is the unauthorized reading of files out-of-sandbox, not modifications to system files.

**Exploit found by Hichem Maloufi (ifpdz)**

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