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CVE-2020-8809 PoC — Gurux GXDLMS Director 安全漏洞

来源
关联漏洞
标题:Gurux GXDLMS Director 安全漏洞 (CVE-2020-8809)
Description:GXDLMS Director是Gurux的一款用于DLMS/COSEM协议设备管理的软件工具。 Gurux GXDLMS Director 8.5.1905.1301之前版本存在安全漏洞,该漏洞源于在更新add-ins和OBIS代码时,程序通过未加密的HTTP连接进行下载。攻击者可利用该漏洞执行代码。
Description
CVE-2020-8809 and CVE-2020-8810
介绍
# Multiple vulnerabilities in Gurux GXDLMS Director – remote code execution


Gurux GXDLMS Director is an open-source Windows program for interacting with energy meters
through the use of DLMS/COSEM protocol.

The software has a remote update functionality for add-in DLLs as well as for files containing
OBIS codes (device-specific definitions needed to interact with the smart meters).

|CVEID|Name of the affected product(s) and version(s)|Problem type|
|-----|----------------------------------------------|------------|
|CVE-2020-8809|Gurux GXDLMS Director (all versions prior to 8.5.1905.1301)|CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check|
|CVE-2020-8810|Gurux GXDLMS Director (all versions)|CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal|

---

**Summary**

All version of Gurux GXDLMS Director prior to 8.5.1905.1301 contain an update mechanism
for add-ins and OBIS codes which works over an unencrypted HTTP connection. Additionally, all
versions contain a path traversal bug which happens when downloading OBIS codes. Those
vulnerabilities can be used by the attacker to achieve code execution.

**Description**

A man-in-the-middle attacker (e.g. a malicious Wi-Fi network operator) can prompt the user to
download updates by modifying the contents of ```gurux.fi/obis/files.xml``` and
```gurux.fi/updates/updates.xml```. Then, the attacker can modify the contents of downloaded files.
In the case of add-ins (if the user is using those), this will lead to code execution. In case of
OBIS codes (which the user is always using as they are needed to communicate with the energy meters),
the attacker can achieve code execution by exploiting a path traversal vulnerability.

When downloading OBIS codes, the program does not verify that the downloaded files are actual OBIS
codes and doesn’t check for path traversal. This allows the attacker to send executable files and
place them in an autorun directory (run after reboot), or to place DLLs inside the existing GXDLMS
Director installation (run on next execution of GXDLMS Director). This can be used to achieve code
execution even if the user doesn’t have any add-ins installed.

**Reproduction**

1. Start an HTTP server.
2. Inside its root directory, create a directory called ```obis```.
3. Create a file ```obis/files.xml``` with the following contents:

```xml
<files>
  <file modified=”28-09-2099″ name=”Iskraemeco”>../../../../../../../../../../Users/Public/Documents/test.txt</file>
</files>
```

4. Create a directory ```Users/Public/Documents```.
5. Create a file ```Users/Public/Documents/test.txt```.
6. On a Windows machine, edit the file ```C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts``` and add the
following line to it: ```127.0.0.1 gurux.fi``` (if your HTTP server is not the same as your Windows machine,
replace ```127.0.0.1``` with the server’s IP).
7. Start Gurux GXDLMS Director. When prompted to download an update, accept.
8. Verify that ```C:\Users\Public\Documents\``` now contains file ```test.txt```.

**Remedy**

Update Gurux GXDLMS Director to the newest version.
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