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Q1What is this vulnerability? (Essence + Consequences)
๐จ **Essence**: SSRF in rConfig v3.9.4 via `path_b` param in `/classes/compareClass.php`.โฆ
๐ก๏ธ **Root Cause**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). <br>๐ **Flaw**: The `doDiff` function fails to validate the `path_b` parameter, allowing injection of malicious URLs.
๐ต๏ธ **Capabilities**: Authenticated attackers can send requests to any URL. <br>๐ **Data Risk**: Access internal services, bypass firewalls, or probe internal infrastructure from the server's perspective.
Q5Is exploitation threshold high? (Auth/Config)
๐ **Threshold**: **Medium**. <br>โ **Auth Required**: Yes, attackers must be **authenticated** to exploit this vulnerability.
Q6Is there a public Exp? (PoC/Wild Exploitation)
๐ **Public Exp?**: Yes. <br>๐ **PoC**: Available via Nuclei templates and GitHub repos (e.g., `zer0yu/CVE_Request`).
Q7How to self-check? (Features/Scanning)
๐ **Self-Check**: Scan for rConfig v3.9.4 instances. <br>๐งช **Test**: Use Nuclei templates targeting `/classes/compareClass.php` with crafted `path_b` payloads.
Q8Is it fixed officially? (Patch/Mitigation)
๐ฉน **Fix**: Update rConfig to a patched version (if available). <br>๐ **Note**: Official patch details are not explicitly listed in the provided data, but upgrading is standard practice.
Q9What if no patch? (Workaround)
๐ง **No Patch?**: Restrict network access to the rConfig server. <br>๐ **Mitigation**: Implement WAF rules to block SSRF payloads in the `path_b` parameter. Limit server outbound connections.
Q10Is it urgent? (Priority Suggestion)
โก **Urgency**: **High** for authenticated users. <br>๐ฏ **Priority**: Patch immediately if exposed. Even with auth requirement, SSRF is critical for internal network reconnaissance.