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CVE-2024-10697 — AI Deep Analysis Summary

CVSS 6.3 · Medium

Q1What is this vulnerability? (Essence + Consequences)

🚨 **Essence**: Command Injection in Tenda AC6 Router. 💥 **Consequences**: Attackers can execute arbitrary system commands, leading to full device compromise, data theft, or network disruption.

Q2Root Cause? (CWE/Flaw)

🛡️ **Root Cause**: **CWE-77** (Command Injection). The flaw lies in the `WriteFacMac` API endpoint where user-supplied parameters are not properly sanitized before being passed to system commands.

Q3Who is affected? (Versions/Components)

📦 **Affected**: **Tenda AC6** Router. Specifically, firmware version **15.03.05.19**. Other versions may be safe, but this specific build is vulnerable.

Q4What can hackers do? (Privileges/Data)

🕵️ **Attacker Capabilities**: With access, hackers gain **Low-Level Privileges** (CVSS: C:L, I:L, A:L).…

Q5Is exploitation threshold high? (Auth/Config)

🔓 **Exploitation Threshold**: **Medium**. Requires **Local Privileges** (PR:L). You must be authenticated on the local network to exploit this. It is not remotely exploitable from the internet without prior auth.

Q6Is there a public Exp? (PoC/Wild Exploitation)

💣 **Public Exploit**: **Yes**. A PoC exists on GitHub (`theRaz0r/iot-mycve`) targeting the `WriteFacMac` endpoint. This increases the risk of automated scanning and exploitation.

Q7How to self-check? (Features/Scanning)

🔍 **Self-Check**: Scan for Tenda AC6 devices running firmware **15.03.05.19**. Check if the `WriteFacMac` API endpoint is accessible and if input validation is missing.…

Q8Is it fixed officially? (Patch/Mitigation)

🩹 **Official Fix**: The vendor **Tenda** is listed. Users should check the official Tenda website for a firmware update patching this command injection flaw.…

Q9What if no patch? (Workaround)

🚧 **No Patch Workaround**: **Isolate the device**. Place the router on a separate VLAN. Disable remote management. If possible, restrict access to the admin interface to trusted IPs only.…

Q10Is it urgent? (Priority Suggestion)

⚠️ **Urgency**: **High Priority**. Although it requires local auth, the existence of a public PoC and the critical nature of router control makes it urgent to patch or mitigate immediately to prevent lateral movement.