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Q1What is this vulnerability? (Essence + Consequences)
๐จ **Essence**: OpenC3 COSMOS suffers from improper input parsing in `String#convert_to_value` via JSON-RPC API. ๐ฅ **Consequences**: Allows **Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.โฆ
๐ก๏ธ **Root Cause**: **CWE-95** (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Code). The flaw lies in how the system parses attacker-controlled text parameters within the JSON-RPC interface.
๐ **Attacker Capabilities**: Full **Ruby Code Execution**. Since it is unauthenticated, hackers can gain complete control over the underlying system, leading to total data compromise and system takeover.
๐ **Public Exploit**: **No**. The `pocs` field is empty in the provided data. However, the severity (CVSS High) suggests high risk of imminent wild exploitation.
Q7How to self-check? (Features/Scanning)
๐ **Self-Check**: Scan for OpenC3 COSMOS instances running versions **5.0.0 - 6.10.1**. Look for exposed JSON-RPC API endpoints. Verify if the `String#convert_to_value` function is accessible without authentication.
Q8Is it fixed officially? (Patch/Mitigation)
๐ฉน **Official Fix**: **Yes**. The vulnerability is tracked under GitHub Advisory **GHSA-w757-4qv9-mghp**. Users should update to the latest patched version immediately. ๐ Published: 2026-01-13.
Q9What if no patch? (Workaround)
๐ **Workaround**: If patching is delayed, **restrict network access** to the JSON-RPC API. Implement strict **WAF rules** to block malicious payloads targeting `String#convert_to_value`.โฆ