在 mtrudel 的 Bandit 库中,HTTP/2 实现存在“无限制或无节流地分配资源”的漏洞。该漏洞允许未经身份验证的远程攻击者,通过发送超出服务器已公布接收窗口大小的 DATA 帧,耗尽服务器内存。 攻击过程如下:攻击者请求一个大于初始 65,535 字节窗口的响应,并故意不发送 WINDOW_UPDATE 帧。这导致流处理进程在发送数据时阻塞,并停止读取后续数据;随后,攻击者在该流上持续发送大量小型 DATA 帧。由于每个 DATA 帧都被暂存于该流的邮箱(mailbox)中,最终导致 BEAM 节点内
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| # | POC Description | Source Link | Shenlong Link |
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No public POC found.
Login to generate AI POC| CVE-2026-114213 | 8.7 HIGH | WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit |
| CVE-2026-109584 | 8.7 HIGH | HTTP/2 cookie crumb join expands a small HPACK header block into an unbounded allocation i |
| CVE-2026-111101 | 8.7 HIGH | HTTP/1.1 chunked request bodies made of 1-byte chunks amplify memory use in Bandit |
| CVE-2026-113436 | 8.7 HIGH | Quadratic bignum parsing of Content-Length and Host port values in Bandit |
| CVE-2026-108529 | 8.7 HIGH | SETTINGS and stream-0 WINDOW_UPDATE frames trigger quadratic work over blocked streams in |
| CVE-2026-115269 | 8.7 HIGH | HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE and SETTINGS frames reset the request body read timeout in Bandit |
| CVE-2026-110499 | 8.7 HIGH | Client-chosen HPACK encoder table size is applied uncapped, growing per-connection state w |
| CVE-2026-111103 | 8.2 HIGH | HTTP/2 StreamError recovery rolls back connection state and bypasses per-connection limits |
| CVE-2026-114216 | 6.3 MEDIUM | Chunk extensions accept bare LF and CR, enabling request smuggling in Bandit |
| CVE-2026-110314 | 6.3 MEDIUM | WebSocket frames keep reaching the WebSock after a server-initiated close in Bandit |