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CVE-2026-16662— MCUboot 未初始化栈信息泄露漏洞

一分钟漏洞结论

影响对象
mcu-tools mcuboot
利用判断
尚无明确在野利用证据,仍需结合暴露面评估
建议动作
优先检查厂商安全公告和参考链接中的修复版本;无法立即升级时,限制受影响服务暴露并加强监测。

中的 函数将镜像的 (期望哈希 TLV)读取到一个从未进行零初始化的栈缓冲区 中。TLV 处理程序仅验证长度上限(即 ),然后精确读取 个字节。因此,如果 TLV 的长度小于 ,则 缓冲区的尾部将保留过期的栈内容。随后,在将数据复制到启动记录时,使用的固定缓冲区大小而非实际长度执行了 ,导致最多 字节的未初始化引导加载器栈数据被写入经过测量的启动记录(measured-boot record)。 该缺陷仅在启用 且没有在任何代码调用 之前检查哈希 TLV 长度的情况下才可达。 会拒绝长度不等于 的哈希 TLV(参见

CVSS 2.4 · Low EPSS 0.14% · P3

可能的 ATT&CK 技术 1 AI

T1005 · Data from Local System

影响版本矩阵 1

厂商产品 版本范围状态
mcu-tools mcuboot 1.6.0< 2.5.0 affected
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一、 漏洞 CVE-2026-16662 基础信息

漏洞信息

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Vulnerability Title
Uninitialised bootloader stack disclosed into the measured-boot attestation record via a short EXPECTED_HASH TLV in MCUboot
来源: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Description
boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image's EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len > sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record. The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when nothing has checked the length of the hash TLV before boot_save_boot_status() reads it. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr's CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. Two kinds of build let a short TLV through: Builds that use pure signatures (MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE_PURE). The signature covers the image itself, so the hash-TLV check in bootutil_img_validate() is compiled out, and a pure-signed image normally carries no hash TLV. A hash TLV is still allowed in the unprotected TLV area, which the signature does not cover, so a short one can be added to a correctly signed image without invalidating it. This applies with every upgrade strategy, including direct-XIP and RAM-load, and the modified image can be delivered through any path that accepts a signed image. Builds with primary-slot validation turned off: the swap and overwrite loader built without MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT, which checks only the image magic before calling boot_add_shared_data(), and the Zephyr single-slot loader (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c) built without it, including the MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT_ONCE variant, which skips validation once the trailer records an earlier successful one. Placing the crafted image requires physical or flash-write access to the device; in a single-slot build with serial recovery enabled, the serial-recovery upload writes the primary slot directly and can place it as well. Outside pure-signature builds, the direct-XIP and RAM-load strategies in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c validate the selected slot unconditionally and are not affected. It is also reachable through a time-of-check/time-of-use change to tamperable external flash between validation and the boot-record read. In these configurations the boot record's measurement is already not trustworthy: the hash copied into the record is the image's own EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, which nothing has verified and which the attacker chooses. The defect therefore does not weaken attestation integrity any further. What it adds is a path for bootloader memory to leave the device: up to 63 bytes (IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1) of uninitialised bootloader stack are embedded in the measurement field that a downstream attestation service sends to a remote verifier. In the configurations analysed the residue is bootloader internal state (TLV offsets and lengths, flash addresses, loop state), not key material, but what occupies that stack region depends on configuration and on which code ran before boot_save_boot_status(). It is reported as a low-severity, defense-in-depth disclosure with no integrity or availability impact. This is distinct from the already-fixed record_len integer underflow in the same routine (GHSA-8hrv-4cp5-4rg3). The fix rejects any EXPECTED_HASH_TLV whose length is not exactly IMAGE_HASH_SIZE.
来源: CVE Program / CVE List V5
CVSS Information
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
来源: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Type
使用未经初始化的变量
来源: CVE Program / CVE List V5

受影响产品

厂商 产品 影响版本 CPE 订阅
mcu-tools mcuboot 1.6.0 ~ 2.5.0 -

二、漏洞 CVE-2026-16662 的公开POC

# POC 描述 源链接 神龙链接
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三、漏洞 CVE-2026-16662 的情报信息

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CVE-2026-16662 补丁与修复 (1)

CVE-2026-16662 厂商安全公告 (1)

同批安全公告 · mcu-tools · 2026-11-13 · 共 8 条

CVE-2026-16664 5.1 MEDIUM MCUboot Zephyr 越界读取漏洞
CVE-2026-16659 4.0 MEDIUM MCUboot 加密镜像上传预认证空指针解引用漏洞
CVE-2026-127916 2.9 LOW MCUboot 镜像验证越界读取漏洞
CVE-2026-16671 2.9 LOW MCUboot SHA-384/512构建栈越界写入漏洞
CVE-2026-127915 2.0 LOW MCUboot bootutil TLV越界读取漏洞
CVE-2026-127928 2.0 LOW MCUboot 密钥栈残留漏洞
CVE-2026-128091 2.0 LOW MCUboot TinyCrypt AES-CTR 密钥未清除漏洞

IV. Related Vulnerabilities