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CVE-2026-52738— ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks

CVSS 6.9 · Medium

Possible ATT&CK Techniques 1AI

T1496 · Resource Hijacking

Affected Version Matrix 2

VendorProductVersion RangeStatus
ZcashFoundationzebra< 4.5.0affected
ZcashFoundationzebra-state< 7.0.0affected
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I. Basic Information for CVE-2026-52738

Vulnerability Information

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Vulnerability Title
ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
CVSS Information
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Type
未捕获的异常
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5

Affected Products

VendorProductAffected VersionsCPESubscribe
ZcashFoundationzebra < 4.5.0 -
ZcashFoundationzebra-state < 7.0.0 -

II. Public POCs for CVE-2026-52738

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III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2026-52738

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Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-52738 (1)

Vendor Pages for CVE-2026-52738 (1)

Same Patch Batch · ZcashFoundation · 2026-08-18 · 10 CVEs total

CVE-2026-527359.3 CRITICALZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser
CVE-2026-527368.7 HIGHZEBRA: Block suppression via NU5 same-header body poisoning of sent-hash cache
CVE-2026-528297.5 HIGHZEBRA: IPv4-Mapped Mempool Misbehavior Update Aborts Zebra Address Book
CVE-2026-527316.5 MEDIUMZEBRA: Full node denial of service via non-ASCII LongPollId in getblocktemplate
CVE-2026-527336.5 MEDIUMZEBRA: Persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via
CVE-2026-527395.9 MEDIUMZEBRA: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier
CVE-2026-527375.3 MEDIUMZEBRA: Sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block
CVE-2026-527325.3 MEDIUMZEBRA: Mempool transaction admission denial via single-peer inbound queue saturation
CVE-2026-527345.3 MEDIUMZEBRA: Unbounded memory leak in mempool download pipeline via timeout path cancel_handles

IV. Related Vulnerabilities

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