CVE-2026-55250— Laravel框架令牌重放漏洞

Maravel-Framework Token Replay Vulnerability via Premature JWT Blacklist Eviction in Tagged Caches

Maravel, a PHP framework oriented towards dependency injection, prior to version 10.74.0 has a high-severity Token Replay Vulnerability arising from a structural lifecycle mismatch between stateless token validation engines and high-performance relational caching layers. Any application with low cache memory that causes premature eviction to free up memory and applications running macropay-solutions/maravel-framework that utilize tymon/jwt-auth for API token authentication and blacklist management or any other package that does the same may be affected. This architectural risk might also impact native Laravel applications utilizing cache tags under specific volatile or eviction-capped environments. tymon/jwt-auth automatically probes for cache tag support. If found, it forcefully wraps 14-day token blacklist entries (jti) inside a relational tymon.jwt tag. In environments where the O(1) Atomic Lazy Eviction model is active — either natively inside Maravel-Framework v20.x or manually backported into v10.x via the explicit DI container singletons provided in PR #104 (App\Cache\TaggedCache and App\Cache\TagSet) — a strict global tracking ceiling (Container::TAGGED_CACHE_TTL_CAP_SECONDS) of 7,200 seconds (2 hours) is enforced to secure the system against memory index bloat. This ceiling forcefully truncates the 14-day blacklist lifespan down to a maximum of 2 hours, after which individual tracking keys naturally expire and disappear from the active cache window. Furthermore, because the optimized engine implements a generational version matrix to achieve O(1) flush speeds, any programmatic or manual invocation of a tag flush or reset (e.g., Cache::tags([...])->flush()) instantly bumps the internal atomic master version pointer. This shifts the computed cryptographic composite hash (sha1($this->tags->getNamespace())) for all overlapping components, rendering the entire existing index immediately unreachable. Consequently, through either natural 2-hour expiration or an intervening tag flush execution (like the cache naturally cleaning old values to free up memory), the invalidation state records are entirely wiped out. Because the tokens' physical cryptographic signatures remain structurally valid for up to 14 days, stolen, hijacked, or legitimately logged-out tokens are instantly and silently resurrected across the entire API gateway, leaving the application critically vulnerable to widespread Token Replay Attacks. Because this issue is caused by an upstream architectural assumption within the tymon/jwt-auth package rather than a core defect inside the framework, there is no direct framework version upgrade that can safely bypass this lifecycle collision without breaking business cache recycling bounds. Maravel version 10.74.0 introduced a way to backport the new fixed tagged cache from 20.x into 10.x by resolving TagSet and TaggedCache from DI, which is how this latent architectural lifecycle vulnerability was discovered. Users must apply the decoupled configuration workaround outlined below. As a workaround, make sure that cache memory size does not generate early natural evictions from cache to free up space, deleting blacklisted jwt ids before they expire. Applications must decouple flat authentication vectors from the relational tagging subsystem. This forces token identifiers to write directly to the primary cache keyspace as flat, un-tagged key-value pairs where they securely retain their unclipped 14-day lifecycle.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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