XPTI(Xen 页表隔离)旨在缓解 Meltdown 漏洞(CVE-2017-5754,XSA-254 的一个方面)。其实现机制是将 64 位半虚拟化(PV)客户机页表项从由客户机选择的根页表复制到一个由 Xen 选定、且实际被硬件使用的根页表中。为了读取客户机的根页表,系统使用直接映射(directmap)。然而,PV 客户机的直接映射可能无法覆盖全部内存;特别是当任何内存区域超出 5 TiB(在配置了 CONFIG_BIGMEM=y 时则为 3.5 TiB)地址边界时,就会出现这种情况。
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