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CVE-2026-86304— MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor

Quick assessment

Affected
CVE-2026-86304
Exploitation
No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation; assess based on exposure
Recommended action
Check the vendor advisory and references for a fixed version. If immediate upgrade is impossible, restrict exposure and increase monitoring.

漏洞描述翻译： MojoX::Authentication 在 Perl 环境下 0.006 之前的版本存在 SAML 认证绕过漏洞，原因是 在构建 时未指定信任锚点（trust anchor）。 具体技术细节如下： 在 的 中，代码调用 时未传入 、 或 参数，随后将返回的 XML 传递给 ，并仅使用身份提供方（IdP）的签名证书作为 。然而，在 0.86 版本之前，该证书仅用于校验加密的断言（assertion）。因此，对于未加密的断言，其签名会直接与响应（response）中自带的证书进行比对验证。 攻击流程

AI Predicted 9.1 Difficulty: Moderate

I. Basic Information for CVE-2026-86304

Vulnerability Information
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Vulnerability Title
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Description
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor. parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries. An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
CVSS Information
N/A
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Type
密码学签名的验证不恰当
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5

Affected Products

Vendor Product Affected Versions CPE Subscribe
- - 0 ~ 0.006 -

II. Public POCs for CVE-2026-86304

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III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2026-86304

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Patches & Fixes for CVE-2026-86304 (1)

Vendor Pages for CVE-2026-86304 (1)

Other References for CVE-2026-86304 (1)

IV. Related Vulnerabilities

Same weakness: CWE-347

V. Comments for CVE-2026-86304

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