Mem0 Self-Hosted Server Hardening: Auth Enforcement for /configure /reset and Sensitive Endpoints

Vulnerability Overview This vulnerability addresses security hardening for self-hosted Mem0 servers, focusing on three key areas: 1. Replacing the outdated Docker image. 2. Requiring administrator roles on configuration and reset endpoints. 3. Hardening security for destructive and sensitive endpoints. Scope of Impact pgvector Docker image: The use of the outdated image poses potential security risks. Configuration and Reset Endpoints: The and endpoints did not require an administrator role, allowing unauthorized users to perform these actions. Destructive and Sensitive Endpoints: Access to , , , and endpoints was not sufficiently restricted, potentially leading to data leaks or destruction. Remediation Steps 1. Replace the pgvector Docker image: - Use the image, which supports PostgreSQL 17.10 and pgvector 0.8.2. - Set the password via the environment variable to avoid hardcoding. - Update the health check command to use instead of the hardcoded . - Add migration guides to and . 2. Require administrator role on configuration and reset endpoints: - The and endpoints now require ; non-administrator calls will return a 403 error. - Add the FastAPI dependency in , combining and enforcing the user role as "admin". - The bootstrap works on a fresh, empty database via the sentinel (a stable UUID, not persisted). - Read-only endpoints ( , ) remain open to all authenticated users. 3. Harden destructive and sensitive endpoints: - (batch deletion) now requires , preventing non-admin users from deleting memories belonging to any user. - now requires , cascading the deletion of all memories associated with the entity. - (audit log) now requires , restricting complete request logs to administrators only. - (unfiltered) includes an inline administrator check; unfiltered lists returning all users' memories are restricted to administrators, while filtered reads remain open to authenticated users. Test Coverage Administrator Authentication (10/10 edge cases passed): - Non-admin API key -> = 403 - Non-admin API key -> = 403 - Admin JWT -> = 200 - Admin JWT -> = 200 - Admin-owned API key -> = 200 - Non-admin -> (read-only) = 200 - No authentication -> = 401 - Invalid key -> = 401 - on empty DB -> = 200 (bootstrap) - pgvector vector operations -> Working pgvector Migration (End-to-End Tests): 1. Build the old stack from ( ) 2. Add 3 real memories, accessed via 3 users and 1 agent using OpenRouter 3. Run backup (185KB) 4. Switch to PR branch ( ) 5. Restore backup following the migration guide (start postgres -> restore -> start mem0) 6. Verification: Admin login works, API key authentication works, all 9 memories exist, vector search works, configuration retained, new memories can be added Breaking Changes and now require an administrator role: API keys from non-admin users will return 403. and remain valid. (batch) and now require an administrator role: Same as above. (audit log) now requires an administrator role: Non-admin users can no longer read request logs. (unfiltered) now requires an administrator role: Listing memories for all users requires admin privileges. Filtered reads by , , or remain open. is now mandatory: will fail if not set. Existing volume users: Users with volumes from need to follow the migration guide ( -> restore). Code Block

Goal Reached Thanks to every supporter — we hit 100%!

Mem0 Self-Hosted Server Hardening: Auth Enforcement for /configure /reset and Sensitive Endpoints

More from this source