OpenWrt luci-app-dockerman Command Injection via ACL Misconfiguration

luci-app-dockerman read ACL exposes ttyd_start, allowing delegated users to execute commands as root Vulnerability Overview Vulnerability Name: luci-app-dockerman read ACL exposes ttyd_start, allowing delegated users to execute commands as root Vulnerability Type: Command Injection Vulnerability Description: An authenticated command execution path was discovered in the OpenWrt LuCI package. The package's read ACL grants the system access to Docker operations, which includes the method. This method is not read-only; it invokes , constructing a shell command by controlling the , , and fields from the request, and executing it via within the root context. CVSS Score: 8.8/10 (High) Attack Vector: Network Attack Complexity: Low Privileges Required: Low User Interaction: None Scope: Unchanged Confidentiality: High Integrity: High Availability: High Scope of Impact Affected Components: - Repository: openwrt/luci - Component: applications/luci-app-dockerman - Runtime Files: - applications/luci-app-dockerman/root/usr/share/rpcd/acl.d/luci-app-dockerman.json - applications/luci-app-dockerman/root/usr/share/rpcd/ucode/docker_rpc.uc Affected Versions: - is included in the OpenWrt LuCI and snapshots. Due to JS/ucode conversion, this includes test builds such as , , and . The specific ucode RPC backend was not present in the checked source code versions. Tested Versions: - OpenWrt SNAPSHOT r34093-42710b004 - docker-20.4.1-r1 - luci-app-dockerman-26.162.29621-507ab5e - luci-base-26.162.29621-507ab5e - ttyd-1.7.7-r1 - ucode-mod-socket-2026.06.03-3c4e65c2-r1 - uhttpd-2026.05.21-16d24f8f-r1 - uhttpd-mod-ubus-2026.06.21-16d24f8f-r1 Remediation Remove from the read ACL: Only truly read-only methods should be retained in read ACLs. Move and other mutating helpers to write/admin privileges: Relocate and other mutating helpers to write/admin permission scopes. Avoid using string-based for : Use argument-style execution or helper functions that avoid shell parsing. Strictly validate , , , and : Container IDs/names should be restricted to Docker-safe characters, and should be limited/sanitized. Add ACL review tests: Implement ACL review tests for LUCI packages that expose local command execution, service control, Docker mutation, or file-executable-equivalent behavior. POC Code

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OpenWrt luci-app-dockerman Command Injection via ACL Misconfiguration

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