Unbounded response body read in URL reader causing DoS vulnerability and fix

Key Vulnerability Information Summary Vulnerability Overview Vulnerability ID: SEC-022 Vulnerability Type: Unbounded Response Body Read Description: The size limit in is advisory only and does not actually restrict the amount of data read. When the response body is excessively large or when is missing or ignored, a malicious or misbehaving server can exhaust memory (DoS). Scope of Impact Affected File: Affected Scenarios: - Streaming response body - Chunked transfer (chunked / no ) - Oversized response body - Error response body Impact: Memory exhaustion (DoS), particularly when is missing or when chunked encoding is used, where may grow unboundedly. Remediation Core Fix: Introduced a bounded streaming reader in , which limits the decompressed byte size based on and cancels the read upon reaching the limit. Behavior Changes: - On the success path, the path no longer caches response bodies that exceed the limit (preventing the caching of excessively large objects). - requests remain lightweight, and the streaming limit applies equally. - Memory consumption after transparent decompression is constrained by this limit. Documentation Updates: - Added a "URL Reader Size Limit" section to , explaining that the limit is enforced through streaming (bounded) reads, applicable to chunked or responses without , and measured based on the decompressed size. - Updated the description of in , clarifying that it constrains the decompressed byte count for "bounded streaming reads". Test Coverage: - Added , covering scenarios such as: streaming read limits, chunked/no limits, non-caching of oversized response bodies, and limits on oversized error bodies. - Verification Results: passed; all passed (including 5 new tests); shows 96.66% line coverage; is clean. POC / Exploitation Code The page does not contain independent POC or exploitation code blocks; it only describes the triggering conditions in text (e.g., oversized response bodies, missing , chunked transfer, etc.).

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Unbounded response body read in URL reader causing DoS vulnerability and fix

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