ClawHub API Anonymous Quota Exhaustion and Identity Spoofing via Trust Forwarded IPs

Vulnerability Key Information Summary Vulnerability Overview Title: Anonymous direct API requests share exhaustible quotas, and an optional forwarded header trust mechanism allows identity spoofing Severity: Moderate Description: Direct anonymous API requests lack trusted caller identity and share default quotas. A single caller can exhaust the quotas allocated to unassociated visitors. When is enabled, clients can arbitrarily select quota identities without authentication at the edge. Impact: Anonymous direct API requests share exhaustible quotas The forwarded header trust mechanism ( ) allows unauthenticated clients to arbitrarily select quota identities Affected product: ClawHub application backend (npm CLI and OpenClaw runtime are standalone products) Scope Affected Version: Fixed Version: CVE ID: No known CVE CWE: CWE-770 Remediation Fixing PR: PR #2834 Fixed Version: Deployment Date: 2026-09-11 Fix Content: Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to this version or later. Regression Verification Results: Before Fix: Reproduced issues with shared anonymous quota consumption and caller identity selection. After Fix: Configured managed ingress policy and legacy flags using a local Convex backend ( ). Direct requests return 401 (no assertion and 401 without Location header). After two forged assertions, the quota remains empty. All Tests Passed: , (6,634 tests, 497 passed, 1 skipped), , Production Credentials and External Data: Not used. Deployment Plan: Deploy a Vercel proxy for identity forwarding, enforcing validated ingress in Convex. Inspect anonymous API reads/downloads via the public origin and authenticated direct API calls (test and production environments). No new shared secret required. The forwarding frontend has been deployed to support backend hardening. Compatibility: The Vercel proxy replaces caller identity headers and forwards the existing authenticated project environment identity. Direct anonymous calls are redirected to the configured public API origin (no shared secret required); forged assertions return 401. API tokens retain per-user allowance. Regression fixes retain endpoint authorization authentication for scanner workflows, signed download metrics, and OAuth signed callbacks. Local Scanner Status: Archived → Confirmation process not accepted; verification/forged metric reception returns 204/401; OAuth retains its callback assertions. Ordinary API tokens do not accept work tokens as ingress exemptions. Severity Assessment: Moderate, unchanged. An unauthenticated caller can consume quotas shared among anonymous API callers. Optional original forwarded header trust allows callers to select quota identities. No availability or quota enforcement issues; authenticated per-user allowances remain isolated. No demonstrated impact on confidentiality or content integrity. No numerical CVSS score assigned. --- Note: POC code or exploitation code is not included in this page.

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ClawHub API Anonymous Quota Exhaustion and Identity Spoofing via Trust Forwarded IPs

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