S-100 Maritime Navigation Parser Vulnerability Analysis: ACE/Heap Overflow

Vulnerability Overview Title: When Fail-Secure Is Not Fail-Safe: Parser Safety in S-100 Maritime Navigation Authors: Hoyeon Cho, Seoleon Lee, Changsu Lee Publication Date: October 12, 2026 Journal: Sensors DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/s26206448 Scope of Impact Domain: Maritime Navigation Systems Specific Issues: - Under the S-100 standard, the parser contains security vulnerabilities when handling malicious input. - The vulnerability can lead to Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE), memory corruption, and Denial of Service (DoS). - Arbitrary code execution was successfully achieved in 14 out of 14 tests (70% of launch attempts). Remediation Measures Recommended Actions: - Implement a four-layer application-level validation sequence to prevent exploitation prior to allocation. - Prevent vulnerabilities without workload-related overhead across three desktop micro-benchmarks. - Passive data constitutes security-relevant parser inputs; maintaining both security and availability requires validation before corruption occurs. Keywords Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) ECDIS HDFS Heap Overflow Integer Overflow Maritime Cybersecurity Memory Corruption Parser Input Validation S-100 Standard S-102 Abstract Key Points: - Safety-critical maritime navigation relies on machine-readable data products. - Digital signatures establish provenance and integrity but do not guarantee OS-level protections in repeated trials. - Files triggered integer overflows and heap buffer overflows without executable payloads. - Under strong memory protections, no tested vulnerabilities resulted in code execution; process termination was predominant, with base triggers causing deterministic Denial of Service. The fail-secure result still removed the navigation display. - Under weak protections, existing function reuse enabled Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) in 14 out of 14 launches (70%). - Neither the continuity of safe navigation nor the integrity of the tested application was maintained. - A four-layer application-level validation sequence prevented vulnerabilities prior to allocation, without imposing workload-related overhead across three desktop micro-benchmarks. - Consequently, passive data serves as security-relevant parser input, and maintaining both security and availability necessitates validation before corruption occurs. Article Metrics Citations: Google Scholar Related Articles: - Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in S-100-Based Maritime Navigation Software - Runtime Policy Enforcement for MCP-Based LLM Agents - Evidence-Carrying Portability Contracts for Compiler Security Instrumentation: Differential Additional Information Version Notes: Version Notes Order Reprints: Order Reprints Special Issue: Cybersecurity and Privacy Protection Conclusion Summary: This study reveals parser security vulnerabilities in S-100 maritime navigation systems and proposes corresponding remediation measures, emphasizing the importance of validation prior to corruption.

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S-100 Maritime Navigation Parser Vulnerability Analysis: ACE/Heap Overflow