Goal Reached Thanks to every supporter — we hit 100%!

Goal: 1000 CNY · Raised: 1336 CNY

100%
Buy Us a Coffee

CVE-2026-96456— Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device

Quick assessment

Affected
Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini
Exploitation
No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation; assess based on exposure
Recommended action
Check the vendor advisory and references for a fixed version. If immediate upgrade is impossible, restrict exposure and increase monitoring.

The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authentica

CVSS 6.3 · Medium
Get alerts for future matching vulnerabilities Log in to subscribe

I. Basic Information for CVE-2026-96456

Vulnerability Information
Have questions about the vulnerability? See if Shenlong's analysis helps!
View Shenlong Deep Dive ↗

Although we use advanced large model technology, its output may still contain inaccurate or outdated information.Shenlong tries to ensure data accuracy, but please verify and judge based on the actual situation.

Vulnerability Title
Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Description
The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other. Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced. This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
CVSS Information
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5
Vulnerability Type
使用共享资源的并发执行不恰当同步问题(竞争条件)
Source: CVE Program / CVE List V5

Affected Products

Vendor Product Affected Versions CPE Subscribe
Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini 0 ~ 1.11.0 -

II. Public POCs for CVE-2026-96456

# POC Description Source Link Shenlong Link
AI-Generated POC Premium

No public POC found.

Login to generate AI POC

III. Intelligence Information for CVE-2026-96456

请登录查看更多情报信息。

Other References for CVE-2026-96456 (4)

IV. Related Vulnerabilities

Same product: Reachy Mini
Same vendor: Pollen Robotics
Same weakness: CWE-362

V. Comments for CVE-2026-96456

No comments yet

Leave a comment